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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, many countries around the world 
have become more fiscally decentralised. Spain pro-
vides a unique case study given it has relatively quickly 
transitioned from a highly centralised country to a 
much more decentralised country, although formally 
not a federation. As part of this decentralisation, auton-
omy over individual income tax rates and brackets was 
recently granted to the regions (Autonomous Commu-
nities), which are similar to states or provinces in other 
countries. In the early 2000s, individual income tax 
brackets and rates were the purview of the central gov-
ernment. Only recently were the Spanish regions 
granted the authority to levy their own individual 
income tax rates on a portion of the personal income 
tax base. Once granted this authority, marginal tax 
rates diverged substantially at the top of the income 
distribution, resulting in substantial tax differentials 
across various regions within Spain. This article reviews 
the economic consequences of Spanish fiscal decen-
tralisation with a particular focus on the impact on the 
mobility of high-income individuals and the implica-
tions of migration decisions for public finances.
Fiscal decentralisations around the world have 
occurred against the backdrop of widening income ine-
quality in many countries. In the Spanish case, recent 
trends in income inequality have been strongly coun-
tercyclical, with inequality increasing substantially in 
the recent recession (Bonhomme and Hospido 2017). 
These increases in income inequality raise policy rele-
vant questions concerning the appropriate level of gov-
ernment to engage in redistribution and the optimal 
degree of progressivity of individual income taxation. 
Indeed, in the presence of decentralisation, different 
regional governments may reach different policy con-
clusions due to different ideological or philosophical 
viewpoints. Most fiscally decentralised countries – 
including Canada and the United States – vary in the 
progressivity of the tax codes across regions due to 
some regions selecting relatively flat tax systems, while 
1 This article discusses the relevant intuitions, summarises some of the key 
results in “Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate 
Changes from Spanish Reforms” (Agrawal and Foremny 2018), and presents 
new results on mobility and inequality. We thank Montse Bassols Santamaria 
and Antoni Castells i Oliveres for helpful discussions. Foremny acknowledges 
funding from Fundación Ramón Areces for this paper and the original rese-
arch summarized in this article.
others adopt progressive systems with high marginal 
tax rates on top income earners.
Spain’s fiscal decentralisation of the tax system 
raises important issues long debated in economics. In 
the Fiscal Decentralisation Theorem, Oates (1972) out-
lines sufficient conditions for the decentralised provi-
sion of public expenditures to be superior to a central-
ised determination of public spending. However, 
Musgrave (1959) argues that redistributive policy 
should remain squarely in the domain of the central 
government. One critical factor determining which of 
these views is dominant relates to how mobile individ-
uals are across sub-national jurisdictions in response 
to the spending and tax policies set by those jurisdic-
tions. Put differently, do the rich flee from high tax 
states, or are they drawn to them based on the public 
services and amenities provided? Or are taxes irrele-
vant to residential decisions?
In this article, we review recent reforms in Spain 
and the relevant institutions concerning Spain’s recent 
decentralisation of individual income taxes. As a part of 
this exercise, we document the degree to which various 
regions reduce earnings inequality due to the heteroge-
neous patterns of tax changes that emerged following 
fiscal decentralisation. We then summarise the empiri-
cal evidence of the migration response of high-income 
taxpayers documented in Agrawal and Foremny (2018). 
In particular, although many factors matter to where 
individuals decide to live, taxes appear to be an impor-
tant determinant. However, the gain in tax revenue 
resulting from the mobility response of individuals due 
to a region lowering its tax burden, at least in the short 
run, is much smaller than the loss in revenue from low-
ering taxes on those individuals that elect to stay. We 
provide new simulations in this paper that show how 
large the tax revenue response is, following a region 
raising or lowering top marginal tax rates by one per-
centage point; regions raising taxes see a substantial 
increase in revenue, even in the presence of a net out-
flow of individuals from their region.
SUB-NATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 
AROUND THE WORLD
Only some countries have decentralised portions of the 
personal income tax. Taxation of the personal income 
tax base is a means of generating revenues that many 
central governments reserve for themselves. However, 
even in cases where personal income tax revenues are 
shared with sub-national jurisdictions through redis-
tributive grants, such as personal income taxation in 
Germany with the Länder, most countries reserve the 
right to set important parameters such as tax rates and 
tax brackets to the central government. The personal 
income tax is also a tool for governments to intervene 
with respect to the income distribution, but the mobil-
ity of individuals might constitute a constraint on the 
ability of sub-national jurisdictions to engage in pro-
gressive redistribution. Countries that allow for local 
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income taxation at the munic-
ipal level tend to permit only a 
local surcharge in the form of a 
flat tax that is not progressive. 
This, among others, is the pre-
vailing system in Nordic Coun-
tries such as Denmark, Nor-
way, Sweden and Finland. The 
autonomy to set progressive 
region- or state-level taxes is 
mostly reserved to federa-
tions, such as Switzerland, the 
United States and Canada2; 
and even then, some states in 
these countries elect to levy 
flat or relatively flat marginal 
tax rate schemes. However, 
de-jure not being a federation, 
Spain has recently imple-
mented a similar system 
granting substantial auton-
omy to the regions. The share 
of taxes, as a fraction of total 
revenue, over which regions 
have a direct impact by setting their own tax rates 
increased from 3% in 1995 to around 30% in 2012. 
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS OF RECENT 
SPANISH REFORMS
Since the ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 
1978, Spain has been divided into seventeen regions, 
the Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autóno-
mas). The regions have a substantial degree of hetero-
geneity with respect to culture, history and language. 
To account for those differences, Spain opted for a sys-
tem of asymmetric fiscal decentralisation. This implies 
that autonomy over spending and revenues varies 
across different regions. Historically, on the revenue 
side, an important difference is between País Vasco 
(Basque Country or Euskadi in Basque language) and 
Navarra (Navarre or Nafarroa) and the remaining 
regions. Those two regions have almost complete tax 
autonomy to levy taxes within their territory, while for 
the remaining 15 regions, taxes were initially much 
more centralised. Until recently, marginal income tax 
rates and tax brackets were determined by the central 
government. Partial autonomy was granted to the 
regions in 1997, but the regions mainly had focused on 
setting specific tax credits (Durán and Esteller 2005; 
Durán and Esteller 2006). In the 2000s, however, several 
waves of decentralisation granted growing autonomy 
over income taxes to the regions. The most important 
of these fiscal decentralisations occurred in 2009-2010, 
with the laws going into effect in the fiscal year 2011. As 
a result of this, regions can autonomously tax 50% of 
the personal income tax base.
2  Canada recently allowed provinces to set marginal tax rates and brackets 
following reforms (Milligan and Smart 2017).
Immediately following this reform, the personal 
income tax became an important tax instrument for 
the regions, as it generated 23% of total regional reve-
nues in 2011. This was partially due to the reforms, 
allowing the regions to keep the revenues collected 
from half of the entire tax base in their territory. In addi-
tion, regions were also given the right to introduce new 
tax brackets on top of those implemented by the cen-
tral government over which they could select their own 
regional marginal tax rates on income. Thus, as of 
today, regions have the ability to set tax brackets and 
marginal tax rates on their half of the personal income 
tax base in addition to levying region-specific credits. A 
diverse picture of different tax schedules across regions 
emerged immediately in 2011: several regions increased 
marginal tax rates substantially, while others lowered 
them relative to the central government benchmark.
Three reasons, which probably interact with each 
other, drive the divergence of tax rates across Autono-
mous Communities. Firstly, generating additional reve-
nues was one of the main reasons for some regions to 
increase tax rates. This was an important driver for 
Autonomous Communities in which budgets were hit 
substantially by the Great Recession around the time of 
the reform. Rising deficits forced those regions to inter-
vene and regional governments used the personal 
income tax (along with the inheritance and wealth tax3) 
to increase revenues. Secondly, political motives were 
at force. These motives are two dimensional. Some 
regions enacted strategic policies such as lower tax 
rates to become attractive places in terms of the busi-
ness environment. Furthermore, ideology plays an 
important role here. Simple correlations indicate that 
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Note: This figure shows regional tax rate changes for a selection of Autonomous Communities relative to the central 
government tax rate.
Source: Authors‘ calculations.
Income in thousands of euros





























ifo DICE Report 2/ 2018 June Volume 16ifo DICE Report 2 / 2018 June Volume 16
right-of-center governments are more likely to set 
lower tax rates than left-of-center governments. 
Thirdly, macro-economic objectives such as redistribu-
tion and fiscal policy played a role. 
Figure 1 shows the difference between regional 
marginal tax rates and the central government tax rate 
at various points of the income distribution (on the 
horizontal axis) across regions (different lines) and 
across time (in the different sub-figures).4 Thus, zero 
indicates that the region set the same tax rate as the 
central government, while positive [negative] values 
indicate the region raised [lowered] tax rates relative to 
the central government. The red vertical line indicates 
the top percentile of the income distribution in each 
year. Several interesting stylised facts can be observed 
from this figure. Firstly, the Comunidad de Madrid and 
Cataluña (Catalonia or Catalunya in Catalan) are the 
regions with the lowest and highest top marginal tax 
rate throughout this period, but this tax rate only 
applied to a very small fraction of taxpayers at the very 
top of the income distribution range. This can be well 
explained by the arguments presented above. Madrid 
was governed by the conservative party and faced less 
budgetary problems compared to the left-of-center 
governed region of Cataluña. The difference in top mar-
ginal tax rates between those two regions was 4% 
points in 2011 and increased subsequently. Secondly, 
we observe that the picture generally shows more 
regional variation over time, indicating that more 
regions decided to deviate from the central tax sched-
ule and by larger amounts. Thirdly, the figure shows 
that changes at the beginning of the period were almost 
exclusively focused on the top of the income distribu-
tion. Later, some regions also increased tax rates in the 
middle of the distribution and, in 2013, regions also 
started to lower tax rates for the lowest parts of the 
income distribution, which might have been driven by 
distributional motives. While the top changes may have 
been politically motivated to increase revenues, the 
changes in the lower part of the income distribution 
may have helped to reduce inequality.
Figure 2 uses individual tax returns released by the 
Ministry of Finance. These data make it possible to 
break down the effect of the personal income tax on 
inequality in 2014. We compute the Gini coefficient – 
which when zero corresponds to perfect equality and 
when one corresponds to maximum inequality – at the 
regional level and compare between market income 
(before any kind of intervention), net income after 
regional taxation, net income after central taxation, 
and net income after both central and regional taxes. 
These data allow us to do the exact calculations as tax 
returns are provided. The data include the tax base and 
exact tax liabilities separated for both layers of govern-
ment, which accounts for the tax rate schedule and tax 
credits and deductions applying at the central and 
regional level. We ignore transfers (such as unemploy-
4 For simplicity, we only show a selected sample of the regions in the figure. 
See Agrawal and Foremny (2018) for a figure with all regions.
ment benefits and other social programmes) to high-
light the distributive effect of the tax system. The Gini 
based on market income varies from 0.50 in Madrid and 
Andalucía to 0.45 in more equal regions such as Can-
tabria. The following two bars indicate the extent to 
which the Gini is reduced due to regional or national 
taxation. We observe two important facts. Firstly, the 
central level intervention always reduces the Gini more 
than regional level taxation. This is due to deductions 
and tax credits, which mostly focus on the lower part of 
the income distribution. While both levels of govern-
ment can implement deductions, the central govern-
ment is more generous with them. This partially offsets 
the potentially more progressive effect of regional mar-
ginal tax rates. Secondly, we observe that the differ-
ence between the effect of the two levels of govern-
ment varies across regions. Most interestingly, the 
regions that also implemented changes in the lower 
part of the income distribution, such as Andalusia and 
Extremadura, have a larger impact on the reduction in 
inequality. However, on average these reductions in 
inequality by regional tax systems are rather limited; 
and it seems that the focus of tax changes was politi-
cally motivated and driven by budgetary pressure. The 
Catalan government, for example, increased tax rates 
with the objective of increasing revenues from this 
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Note: This figure shows the Gini for market income before taxes and after taxes by 
region.
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on Muestra IRPF IEF−AEAT 
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source after regional budgets 
were under fiscal pressure in 
the aftermath of the crisis.
Given that marginal tax 
rates diverged differentially at 
the top and bottom of the 
income distribution, it is inter-
esting to look at the previous 
result over time. To do so, Fig-
ure 3 shows the difference in 
the after-tax Gini accounting for 
regional taxes and the after-tax 
Gini accounting for central gov-
ernment taxes between 2010 
and 2014 (i.e. the difference 
between the second and third 
bar of the previous graph). For 
simplicity’s sake, we present 
four regions, Madrid and Cata-
luña and Andalusia and 
Extremadura because two of those regions had the 
largest variation at the lower part of the income distri-
bution. Following the reforms, the Gini is higher after 
accounting for regional taxes than after accounting for 
central taxes only. However, variation across the 
regions widens marginally over time and indicates the 
different roles of progressive taxation. Compared to the 
effect of central government taxes on the Gini, Madrid, 
which lowered its tax rates, has a regional tax system 
that reduces inequality less than Cataluña, which 
raised its tax rates. The other two regions in this graph 
are those that implemented interesting changes in the 
middle and the bottom of the income distribution (see 
Figure 1). Figure 3 shows that the regional impact of 
those two regions has been larger than in the other 
ones, pushing the regional Gini closer to the central 
government. However, these changes remain relatively 
small. For example, by 2014, the difference in Extrema-
dura was 0.5% of the after-tax Gini while in Madrid it 
was 1.5% of the after-tax Gini. These differences in the 
regional effect on the Gini coefficient depend on the tax 
rates selected by the regions, the credits and deduc-
tions adopted by the regions, and the initial distribu-
tion of income.
POTENTIAL REVENUE EFFECTS OF SPANISH 
DECENTRALISATION
As mentioned previously, one reason why some regions 
opted for higher or lower tax rates was the Great Reces-
sion and increasing revenue needs. Fiscal decentralisa-
tion of taxation authority may result in numerous 
potential responses, which eventually affect tax reve-
nues. Firstly, regions raising taxes see higher revenues 
on their existing tax base. This effect is potentially off-
set by behavioural responses. In regions increasing 
marginal tax rates, individuals may reduce labour sup-
ply or find more creative ways to engage in tax avoid-
ance. Thus, given the large body of literature on taxable 
income responses, we would expect these regions to 
see declines in reported taxable income. A final 
response involves the location of individuals following 
decentralised tax changes. All else equal, an increase in 
the tax rate in one region might spur migration from 
high-tax tax regions to relatively low-tax regions. This 
response, combined with taxable income responses, 
suggests that the tax base will shrink in regions that 
raise their taxes relative to those regions that lower 
their taxes. Ignoring fiscal externalities and effects of 
tax competition, following Piketty and Saez (2013), we 
can decompose the effect of changes in taxes into these 
three components:
1. A mechanical effect. This is the change in tax rev-
enue that would occur on the existing tax base if 
there were no behavioural responses (changes in 
earnings or residences) in response to the tax 
change.
2. A taxable income effect. This is the change in tax 
revenue resulting from distortions to the amount of 
taxable income individuals declare, which, for 
example, could change as a result of earnings 
(labour supply) responses.
3. A migration effect. This is the change in tax reve-
nue realised by any one region because of a switch 
in the residential location decisions of taxpayers 
from one region to another.
It is worth noting that the last two effects may include 
real and non-real responses. By this we mean, for 
example, that some individuals may not actually move 
across regions, but rather might “falsely” declare a pri-
mary residence as a second home in order to reduce tax 
liability. Taxable income responses may also capture 
avoidance or evasion opportunities.
It follows that if the mechanical effect dominates 
the two behavioural effects, governments can increase 
revenue from raising taxes. The last two effects depend 
critically on the elasticity of taxable income and the 
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Note: This figure shows the Gini for income after regional taxes minus the Gini after central government taxes for four 
regions.
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on Muestra IRPF IEF−AEAT (Declarantes) 2010-2014. © ifo Institute




ifo DICE Report 2/ 2018 June Volume 16ifo DICE Report 2 / 2018 June Volume 16
the absence of migration effects, only the elasticity of 
taxable income is relevant. The empirical evidence, 
although varying substantially, suggests that taxable 
income effects are relatively small (Saez, Slemrod and 
Giertz 2012), which allows governments to sustain 
potentially high top marginal tax rates. However, it 
remains an open question: How large are migration 
effects in Spain when taxes are decentralized and what 
are the implications for tax revenue?
EVIDENCE ON MIGRATION
Against that backdrop, Agrawal and Foremny (2018) 
document the migration responses of individuals in the 
top 1% of the income distribution in response to the 
fiscal decentralisation of part of the personal income 
tax base to the regions. The effects of such a massive 
decentralisation remain unknown as yet, given that 
much of the prior literature on migration has focused 
on cross-country tax variation for a selected group of 
industries or occupations (Kleven, Landais and Saez 
2013; Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016) and the 
effect of changes to already existing state taxes on 
migration (Young and Varner 2011; Young, Varner, Lurie 
and Prisinzano 2016; Moretti and Wilson 2017). Some of 
these state tax systems have partially employ-
ment-based taxation rather than residence-based tax-
ation, so that mobility, especially within a local metro-
politan area, may occur through employment rather 
than residence shifts (Agrawal and Hoyt 2018). Spain’s 
tax system is entirely residence-based, facilitating 
identification of any migration elasticity.
To study migration of high-income households, 
Agrawal and Foremny (2018) use administrative data 
from Social Security and tax records from Spain’s Con-
tinuous Sample of Employment Histories (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales), which contains informa-
tion on income, residential location, and industry and 
occupation. These income data are then inputs to a tax 
calculator to determine the 
average and marginal tax rate 
each individual would face for 
all regions within Spain. Using 
this information, Agrawal and 
Foremny (2018) show that a 
1% increase in the net-of-av-
erage-tax rate for a region 
relative to others increases 
the probability of moving to 
that region by 1.7 percentage 
points. This implies, for exam-
ple, that when Madrid cut 
taxes by 0.4 percentage points 
for top earners, the probability 
of moving to Madrid increased 
by 1.1 percentage points. The 
elasticity of the stock of top 
taxpayers in a given region 
is approximately 0.85. Using 
these estimates, Agrawal and Foremny (2018) show 
that, under certain assumptions, the mean tax change 
on top earners in each region results in a mechanical 
effect that is larger than both behavioural effects com-
bined (taxable income and mobility). The revenue sim-
ulations  in Agrawal and Foremny (2018) have different 
revenue changes for different regions partly because 
the sizes of the tax changes are different.
Here we extend this analysis to focus on the case 
where all regions change their tax rates on top earners 
by the same magnitude, but in opposite directions. In 
particular, we focus on a one percentage point change 
in the marginal tax rate on income above 90,000 euros. 
For the purpose of these simulations, we assume that 
the seven regions that raised their tax rates relative to 
the central government by 2014 only raised the mar-
ginal tax rate on income above 90,000 euros by one per-
centage point. On the other hand, we assume that the 
seven regions that lowered or maintained5 their tax 
rates by 2014 relative to the central government, only 
lowered the marginal tax rate on income above 90,000 
euros by one percentage point. Given the magnitudes 
of the tax changes are identical in all of the regions, the 
mechanical effect will differ because the existing stock 
of top taxpayers and the average amount of income 
above this bracket threshold vary by region. The taxa-
ble income response additionally depends on the elas-
ticity of taxable income and the shape of the distribu-
tion of income (the Pareto parameter). The mobility 
response depends on the estimates of the stock elastic-
ity, as well as those factors in the mechanical effect.
Figure 4 presents the simulation results for a one 
percentage point change in the marginal tax rate on 
income above 90,000 euros. Consider the case of 
Madrid. Madrid lowered its tax rates, so we consider a 
one percentage point decline in their top marginal 
rates. Using the random sample of Social Security data, 
5  Valencia was the one region that mimicked the central government tax 
rates in the years immediately following the reform.
















Note: We show the mechanical, taxable income and mobility responses, as a percentage of total personal income tax 
revenue, for a percentage point change in tax rates above 90,000 euros. Regions with positive mechanical effects are 
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we can determine that there are approximately 75,000 
individuals in the top 1% residing in Madrid with an 
average income of 171,000 euros (therefore, with 81,000 
euros subject to our simulated reform). This yields a 
mechanical decrease – assuming no individuals change 
their behaviour – in taxes of approximately 61 million 
euros. Relative to 8.4 billion euros raised from the per-
sonal income tax in Madrid, this is a 0.72% change in 
revenue, as shown in the Figure. To calculate the taxa-
ble income response, we use an elasticity of taxable 
income slightly below the midpoint in the literature 
(Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2012), accounting for the fact 
that we only study the tax on labour income and not 
capital income. That, combined with an estimate 
Pareto parameter of 2.1 and the information above, 
yields an increase in taxable income, due to, for exam-
ple, increases in labour supply from the lower tax rates, 
of five million euros or 0.06% of revenue. The migration 
response relies on the above information plus the esti-
mates of the stock elasticity in Agrawal and Foremny 
(2018). This implies a 12 million euro increase in reve-
nue due to the net inflow of top taxpayers to Madrid due 
to lower tax rates, or 0.14% of tax revenue. As can be 
seen, the net effect of summing all three effects yields 
a net revenue loss of approximately 0.5% of total 
income tax revenues for the region of Madrid from this 
lower tax rate on top incomes. The total change in rev-
enue as a percentage of income tax revenue is depicted 
in Figure 5.
In the opposite direction, consider Cataluña, which 
increased its taxes. Using the same magnitude tax 
change on income above 90,000 euros as Madrid, but 
instead increasing taxes, we can compare the revenue 
effects to Madrid. Cataluña has a smaller number of 
individuals – approximately 60,000 – in the top 1% and 
a lower mean income of 152,000 euros for this group 
(therefore, with 61,000 euros subject to our simulated 
reform). This yields a mechanical decrease in taxes of 
approximately 37 million euros. Relative to 7.5 billion 
euros raised from the personal 
income tax, this is a 0.48% 
change in revenue shown in 
the Figure. The pareto param-
eter is higher in Cataluña, but 
the size of the tax base is 
smaller, and implies a 0.05% 
decrease (3.7 million euros) in 
revenue due to declines in 
reported taxable income. The 
net outflow of migration due 
to higher taxes implies a 0.08% 
decrease in revenue (6.8 mil-
lion euros). The total increase 
in revenue due to higher taxes 
is 0.33%.
As can be seen from  these 
two examples, tax increases 
result in increases in revenue, 
while tax decreases result in 
declines in revenue – even in the presence of mobility. 
Fiscal decentralisation does not, at least in the short 
run, appear to pose a threat to revenue-raising capabil-
ities given the magnitudes of these tax changes. The 
magnitudes of the revenue changes depend upon the 
elasticity of the population stock, the elasticity of taxa-
ble income, as well as characteristics of region size 
along with its distribution of income. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our tax revenue simulations, combined with evidence 
on inequality after taxes, suggest that regions adjusting 
their tax rates in the presence of mobility need not 
threaten progressive redistribution in the short run. 
Indeed, fiscal decentralisation gives regions the auton-
omy to shape a tax system consistent with their politi-
cal ideology and revenue needs. This heterogeneity 
may be especially important in a country with hetero-
geneous cultures, languages, and ideologies such as 
Spain. Furthermore, it helps to reduce fiscal imbal-
ances between central and regional governments, 
which may have a positive impact on fiscal discipline.
However, this comes with several caveats. Firstly, 
the asymmetric fiscal decentralisation and higher 
autonomy in some regions (Basque Country and 
Navarra) than others create political tensions which, 
among many others, might be one of the reasons for 
regions pushing for more autonomy. More regional 
autonomy through further fiscal decentralisation 
might be feasible to implement, as migration responses 
remain moderate. At the same time, this might intensify 
tax competition between the regions, which even in 
the existing system created the word “fiscal dumping”, 
for which Madrid in particular was accused. Tax com-
petition may, in turn, place additional constraints on 
governments, resulting in tax rates that may be ineffi-
ciently low. Indeed, the inequality measures presented 
here suggest that inequality is higher after regional 

















Note: We show the total revenue change, as a percentage of total personal income tax revenue, for a percentage point 
change in tax rates above 90,000 euros. Regions Madrid to Valencia are assumed to have decreased taxes, while regions
Cantabria to Murcia are assumed to have increased taxes.
Source: Authors‘ calculations. © ifo Institute
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taxes than after central government taxes; and this may 
be a result of mobility.
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